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Introduction 
Conducting fieldwork in conflict situations raises specific 
methodological and ethical questions. While Taussig 
(1984, 1987, 1992) and Scheper-Hughes (1995) have 
called for anthropologists to speak out against terror, they 
have not addressed in detail how researchers working in 
war zones should negotiate the pragmatics of representa- 
tion in dangerous field situations. As Kovats-Bernat 
(2002) notes, although there is a growing literature that 
aims to develop theoretical approaches to the study of vio- 
lence, relatively little attention has been given to the prac- 
tical concerns surrounding fieldwork in conflict 
situations.1 What is needed, he argues, is 'the adoption of 
new tactics for ethnographic research and survival in dan- 
gerous field sites - strategies that challenge the conven- 
tional ethics of the discipline, reconfigure the relationships 
between anthropologist and informant, and compel inno- 
vation in negotiating the exchange of data under hazardous 
circumstances' (2002: 208). Danny Hoffman (2003) simi- 
larly addresses this issue with his call for a reconsideration 
of 'frontline anthropology' techniques. We contribute to 
this discussion by examining these questions within the 
rapidly changing context of Nepal, where a bitter internal 
conflict has developed over the last eight years. 
Until recently Nepal was considered a relatively 
unproblematic place to do anthropological fieldwork, per- 
haps even an 'ideal' place, given the apparent isolation of 
some of its people from the effects of modernity. The early 
'regional ethnography traditions' (Fardon 1990) devel- 
oped in Nepal tended to marginalize the state in their 
analysis. In the last few years, however, the situation has 
changed and it has become impossible to ignore issues of 
politics and the state.2 
Since the far-left Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 
proclaimed a 'people's war' in 1996 a brutal conflict has 
ensued, in response to which the government declared a 
state of emergency which lasted from November 2001 
until August 2002. A seven-month ceasefire broke down 
in August 2003, and there has since been a significant 
increase in militarization. At the time of writing, it is esti- 
mated that over 8000 people have been killed in the con- 
flict, with approximately 1000 people killed and 600 
 
arrested and held incommunicado just in the four months 
since the last ceasefire collapsed.3 The National Human 
Rights Commission of Nepal lists 808 people as having 
disappeared since 2000, with 663 of those abducted by 
the state.4 This figure gives Nepal one of the highest 
numbers of disappearances for this time period anywhere 
in the world, causing the UN Commission on Human 
Rights to express grave concern.5 
Clearly the most serious internal crisis in Nepal's 
modern history (Thapa 2002), this de facto civil war has 
radically altered the context in which anthropologists 
work. The state response to the violent Maoist movement 
under the terms of the emergency included the suspension 
of human rights, repression of free speech, and military 
deployment to squash the insurgency.6 Such developments 
have placed researchers in increasingly complex relation- 
ships with regard to informants and their safety, the state 
machinery in Nepal and the governments of the countries 
in which we live. 
In this article we consider some of the practical, theo- 
retical and political implications of this changed context 
for fieldwork and ethnographic writing from our perspec- 
tive as foreign researchers. In order to create a broad 
framework for discussion we have each contributed a sec- 
tion. Shneiderman draws on a specific research experi- 
ence in rural Nepal as a case study of the ways in which 
'complicity' with informants in the field and colleagues in 
Kathmandu took on new dimensions as the Maoist situa- 
tion evolved. Pettigrew focuses on how a changed polit- 
ical context radically alters the impact of our scholarly 
representations of informants, and considers practically 
how we may most effectively protect those with whom we 
work. Harper questions how we may engage critically 
with our own nations' changing policies towards Nepal in 
particular, and towards the host countries in which we 
work in general. He examines the ASA (Association of 
Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth) 
ethical guidelines in relation to broader political complic- 
ities to pose the question: to whom are we responsible, as 
scholars and individuals, when we represent Nepal? We 
conclude by reflecting upon several shared themes 
emerging from our accounts which compel us to rethink 
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Fig. 2. Police inspecting an 
ambulance destroyed by a 
Maoist petrol bomb attack, in 
which several civilans 
suffered severe burn injuries, 
April l999. 
 
 
 
 
6. The repressive state 
response to the Maoist 
movement dates back to the 
armed police operations of 
Operation Romeo (1995) and 
Operation Kilo Siera 2 
(1998), both of which 
resulted in mass deaths, 
disappearances and 
unwarranted arrests (Thapa 
with Sijapati 2003). 
7. I do not intend to 
replicate the Orientalist 
narrative of Nepal as a 
peaceful Shangri-la. Rather, I 
emphasize how the focal 
point of daily life among the 
villagers with whom I work 
shifted rapidly from concerns 
about subsistence and food 
shortage to fear of political 
violence. 
8. Amnesty International 
reports that, 'The definition 
of what constitutes a 
"Maoist", according to army 
commanders interviewed by 
Amnesty International, 
includes civilians who give 
shelter, food or money to the 
armed Maoists' (2002: 8). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 (right). Cartoon 
showing a Nepali family 
shocked to realize that a 
ceasefire between the 
Maoists and the state 
security forces has been used 
by both sides to rearm, 
increasing the country's 
overall militarization with 
new shipments of weapons 
from international sources. 
 
Fig. 4 (left). Maoist guerrilla 
with muzzle-loader and 
 pressure cooker bomb' 
slung around his neck. 
Surkhet district, June 2003. 
 
 
 
existing ethical standards for fieldwork, as well as our 
own positions in relation to such standards. 
 
Sara Shneiderman 
In September 1999 I began my period of tenure as a 
Fulbright Scholar in Nepal, with a proposal to conduct 
basic ethnographic research on ethnic and religious iden- 
tity among a politically under-represented ethnic group in 
two eastern districts. Having lived in Nepal since 1997, I 
was well aware of the 'people's war' that had been under 
way for three years at the time I began my research, but I 
had never considered the possibility that it would affect 
my work. Although both of the districts in which I 
intended to work were listed as 'affected' by the US 
Embassy in Kathmandu, I had seen no evidence of Maoist 
activities on my previous visits there. Like most urban res- 
idents at the time, I believed that the insurgency was lim- 
ited to the mid-western areas of Rolpa, Rukum and 
Jajarkot where it had begun. 
By November 1999, when I received my first hand- 
delivered message from the Maoists, it became clear that 
my earlier assumptions were mistaken. I was warned that 
I was under surveillance and should leave the village. 
However, it took several months for the full implications 
of this for my work to sink in. Only now, with a few years' 
distance, am I able to reflect productively on the broader 
issues surrounding the practice of ethnography in conflict 
situations that I wish I had considered before beginning 
my work. This is the crux of the problem I seek to discuss 
here: how do we adjust our practice when the conditions of 
our anthropological work change suddenly from those of 
relative peace to the tension of violent political conflict?7 
In particular, when the foresight with which anthropolo- 
gists who consciously craft research projects in known 
conflict zones is unavailable, how must our relationships 
with local colleagues adapt in order to accommodate the 
changing situation? 
In addressing these questions, I draw upon George 
Marcus' notion of 'complicity' (1999) to consider the full 
complexity of relationships between informants and social 
scientists in emerging conflict situations such as the one I 
faced in Nepal. Marcus suggests a shift from the tradi- 
tional relationship of 'rapport', presumed between indige- 
nous informants and anthropologists, to one of 
'complicity'. Neither anthropologist nor subject can limit 
their project to the local alone; instead, both must work 
towards situating themselves within the bigger picture by 
acknowledging the complicity of their goals and their con- 
stant engagement with an external 'third' (Marcus 1999: 
101). In the situation I describe, the 'third' might be con- 
sidered the insurgency itself - a powerful ideological 
framework that articulated long-standing indigenous frus- 
trations and gave rise to new forms of political conscious- 
ness, but also carried with it threats of violence emanating 
from previously unknown sources whose intentions were 
difficult to ascertain (both Maoist activists and state secu- 
rity forces). My relationships with local colleagues were 
reconfigured by the rapid establishment of Maoist 'base 
areas' in the locality and the state response to them. My 
local colleagues and I entered into new forms of com- 
plicity as the primary goals for all of us shifted towards 
maintaining safety and understanding the evolving situa- 
tion. 
During the early phase of the Maoist presence in my 
research area in late 1998-early 1999, the Maoists were an 
unknown quantity, and most villagers vacillated between 
fear of the unknown and a bravado that trivialized such 
fears. I did not know whether the Maoists would target me 
on account of my 'foreignness' - they had made clear anti- 
foreign statements and were forcing foreign development 
workers to leave the area - or whether my local friends and 
co-workers would be targeted because of their engagement 
with me. It was difficult to discuss the validity of the 
numerous rumours of Maoist activities - both destructive 
and constructive - with my close local friends, since 
during this early phase many people were still in denial 
about the very real effects of the insurgency on their own 
lives. The insinuation that I might be in danger was an 
implicit challenge to my local hosts' ability to protect me, 
and thereby an insult. At the same time, the suggestion that 
they might be in danger because of their relationship with 
me was hard for many to accept. Until that point, relation- 
ships with foreigners had been considered as positive sym- 
bolic capital within local networks of power and status. 
This was particularly so for the poor and disenfranchised 
community with whom I worked: the presence of foreign 
researchers investigating their culture and history was a 
major asset in their campaign to gain recognition as a dis- 
tinct ethnic group within the Nepali nation-state. Initially 
the fear that I would leave without completing my work 
outweighed the fear of Maoist repercussions. These issues 
combined to make it nearly impossible to discuss openly 
the potential dangers to either me or my informants. 
I therefore decided to stay away from the village for 
three months, from December 1999 to February 2000. 
Instead I lived in Kathmandu, where I was protected by 
urban anonymity, and my absence from the village 
removed any danger that I might precipitate for my friends 
there. Although my closest research assistant understood 
and supported my decision, it was largely against the 
advice and wishes of the larger village community, who 
repeatedly asked me to return. 
The multi-layered nature of complicity in action is evi- 
dent here. Had I sought to maintain my original complicity 
with my local informants' agenda of gaining power and 
status within the identity politics framework, I might have 
listened to the narrative of bravado, which claimed that the 
Maoists posed little real danger. Yet from my perspective, 
the situation required an acknowledgement of the real 
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Fig. 5. Water tap in a rural 
area of Nepal inscribed with 
graffiti reading Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist)'. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. As van der Geest (2003) 
has recently shown, it is 
possible to maintain 
confidentiality if informants, 
the location and the 
anthropologist are all given 
pseudonyms. This is not 
possible in my case as I have 
always previously written 
under my own name. 
10. Shneiderman is an 
American citizen and Harper  
a British citizen. Pettigrew, an 
Irish citizen, is resident in the 
UK. 
11. These issues were 
addressed in a recent article in 
The Guardian that critiqued 
the current British policy 
towards Nepal. The author 
was identified as someone 
working within the 
development apparatus inside 
Nepal, but felt compelled to 
use a pseudonym. (Porter, I. 
2003. Britain must act to stop 
the slide to all-out war in 
Nepal. The Guardian, 18 
October). 
12. See Roka (2003) for a 
good overview of the broader 
social problems militarization 
has generated. 
13. www.angelfire.com/ 
empire2/nepal/patra.html. The 
US ultimately allocated more 
than $14 million in military 
aid to Nepal. 
14. www.theasa.org/ethics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Rural Nepalis trapped 
between the Maoists (left) 
and the state security forces 
(right), with literally  
nowhere to turn. 
 
 
 
changes and a consequent shift towards emphasizing 
safety rather than pre-existing local goals. In making the 
decision to stay away, I entered a complex and ongoing set 
of negotiations between complicities - with the villagers 
with whom I had originally worked, the Maoists, the state, 
and the urban intelligentsia, whose attitudes towards the 
Maoist movement differed substantially from those I had 
encountered in the village. 
The initial tension between my local friends' desire to 
have me stay and my own concerns about their safety was 
temporarily resolved by a Maoist visit to my village 
'home' in late February. My host family was questioned 
intensively, although it was clear that the Maoist visitors 
already had most of the essential information about my 
activities. While the encounter began in an atmosphere of 
fear, by the end the Maoists reassured my hosts that neither 
they nor I were in any real danger. They asked the family 
to communicate to me that I was given explicit permission 
to stay because I was not engaged in any development- 
related activities and my work was aimed at helping the 
poorest community in the area gain recognition. The 
unknown had made itself known, and some of my fears 
were allayed. I returned to the village soon afterwards to 
continue with my work. It only occurred to me much later 
that with that move I entered into a new relationship of 
complicity with the Maoists and their supporters - while 
almost all other foreigners had been expelled from the 
area, I was invited back specifically because my work was 
perceived as implicitly supporting the Maoist agenda of 
raising class consciousness among disenfranchised rural 
populations. 
This second phase of fieldwork in the now Maoist- 
occupied area proceeded relatively smoothly, and I spent 
the period between February and October 2000 living 
almost entirely in the village. During this time, some vil- 
lagers made the transition from fearing the Maoists to tac- 
itly supporting their activities. Only a very small number 
of individuals left to join the armed Maoist militia, but 
many more saw them as a potentially plausible alternative 
to the corrupt and ineffectual state, which was almost 
entirely absent in their lives except through relations of 
exploitation. A new sort of complicity arose through my 
attempts to make sense of the apparent sympathy among 
people I greatly respected for a movement which I knew to 
be unacceptably violent. Both my own continued well- 
being and that of my informants, not to mention my ability 
to stay in the area, became in part dependent upon my will- 
ingness to acknowledge the pragmatic Maoist agenda as a 
potentially worthwhile one, however problematic in its 
implementation. 
This approach was in stark opposition to that taken by 
most government officials, urban Nepali intellectuals, for- 
eign diplomats and aid workers back in Kathmandu at the 
time. For the most part they continued to view the insur- 
gency as a law and order problem rather than a political 
battle which required intensive attention at the local level. 
When I tried to explain what I had witnessed at the village 
level during brief trips back to the city, I was repeatedly 
chastised for my naivete in granting the Maoists any cred- 
ibility. I was even accused of lying when I described the 
extent to which the Maoists had established themselves as 
a powerful force at the local level. At this juncture, I found 
myself caught between competing complicities, a situation 
Marcus describes as inherent in multi-sited fieldwork 
(1999). While I needed to maintain good relationships 
with people in influential positions in the government as 
well as in urban-based professional networks, I could not 
renege on my commitment to represent the village-level 
reality as my friends and informants there saw it. 
I was therefore caught in the bind of 'accidental anthro- 
pology' so well described by Frank Pieke (1995). Having 
stumbled into a situation I had never envisaged being in, I 
felt compelled to tell the story I knew, both in my academic 
writing and in other public forums, yet without the benefit 
of consciously constructed research techniques or 
approval from the necessary governmental or academic 
entities. I would have benefited from a careful considera- 
tion of the questions of representation that Judith 
Pettigrew and Ian Harper address in the following sections 
of this article. 
 
Judith Pettigrew 
Since 1990 I have conducted research in Nepal on a range 
of topics including the politics of cultural preservation, 
ethno-history, health and religion. My work through the 
1990s was clearly positioned as the study of a particular 
ethnic group in a specific region of the country. While my 
research also addressed issues of wider national concern in 
Nepal such as the reinterpretation of ethnic identity in the 
aftermath of the movement to restore democracy in 1990, 
it focused on exploring and representing the particular per- 
spectives of the group among whom I worked. An impor- 
tant part of my analysis was situating my work in relation 
to the existing research conducted on this ethnic group. 
In 2000 I returned to the villages where I had done much 
of my earlier research after a gap of two years and discov- 
ered that there were large numbers of Maoists in the area. 
Interviews with middle-aged and older people threw up 
two recurring themes: their reluctance to accept that local 
youth were involved with the Maoists, and their surprise 
when they discovered women's involvement. The Maoists 
were also emerging as a catalyst that brought pre-existing 
unexpressed concerns to the surface. Talking about the 
guerrillas provided an indirect way of talking about con- 
flict between neighbours and kin, and the fears associated 
with these conflicts. I decided to undertake a research 
project on the insurgency shortly after taking part in a con- SU
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Fig. 7. A Maoist woman 
fighter in combat fatigues 
walks up a hillside path. 
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ference on the Maoist movement in the autumn of 2001, as 
I felt that inadequate attention was being paid to the impact 
of the conflict on the people being most affected by it - 
rural civilians. 
I began research in December 2001 just after the decla- 
ration of the state of emergency. My current project is 
multi-sited and includes rural locations in different parts of 
the country. I chose a multi-sited approach as I felt that 
single-location research - a strategy which has previously 
been widely used in academic social science research in 
Nepal - was not the most appropriate mode in which to 
study the insurgency. In a single location, while there are 
the obvious problems of undertaking research in a dan- 
gerous and volatile situation and the heightened risks of 
long-term exposure, there are also additional problems 
such as drawing unwarranted attention to the research, the 
researchers and/or the host community, which could have 
widespread and negative implications for all concerned. 
Using a multi-sited approach, data can be gathered in rel- 
atively short periods of time, which may be essential to 
avoid attracting attention to the informant or the 
researcher, or to avoid linking the informant with the 
researchers, who as outsiders may be under suspicion. By 
gathering data in a number of conflict-affected areas it is 
easier to maintain the anonymity of all involved, as 
research is undertaken in geographically diverse locations 
with a wide range of informants. 
Having decided on the design of my project, I needed to 
select field sites. As I was concerned about what was hap- 
pening in the area I knew best, and was aware that I had a 
comparative peacetime perspective which would be valu- 
able in identifying conflict-related change, I selected my 
original rural field site for inclusion in the project. 
I returned to the village in the summer of 2002 to find 
that on most nights groups of armed insurgents entered the 
village demanding food and shelter. The security forces 
also visited and accused villagers of supporting Maoists.8 
While the security forces were in the village, people feared 
that the army would learn about their interactions with the 
Maoists. When the army left, villagers worried that the 
Maoists would interpret their interactions with the army as 
treacherous. The Maoists had accused people in neigh- 
bouring villages of being spies, although no one in my vil- 
lage had been punished yet. In a nearby village an army 
officer was killed by Maoists and shortly afterwards the 
army came to search the village and hit people with rifles. 
According to my informants, during one search a heli- 
copter circled overhead and fired into the village and the 
nearby forest. The firing was aimed at houses where the 
soldiers thought they saw smoke, which might indicate 
that villagers were preparing food for Maoists. A few days 
later somebody told the army that Maoists were eating a 
meal in the next village. By the time the soldiers arrived 
the Maoists had left and only the family remained. The 
soldiers came in with guns firing and killed the newly- 
married daughter and her husband who was home on leave 
from his work in Saudi Arabia. When I talked to inform- 
ants about visiting nearby villages where these incidents 
had taken place in order to document them, people were 
horrified and asked if I did not realize how dangerous it 
was even to talk of such things. When I enquired whether 
I could report these incidents to a human rights organiza- 
tion, I was told that I must not report them in the nearby 
town, but could talk about them in the capital city. 
Such concerns - about human rights documentation, 
attacks from helicopter gunships and random shooting - 
introduced an entirely new set of complications to the 
already sensitive issues of representation that I had strug- 
gled with in my earlier research. My previous approach to 
confidentiality was shaped by the urban Nepali cultural 
preservationists I had worked among, who found the 
common anthropological convention of using pseudo- 
nyms for informants and field locations deeply suspect. 
Regarding the writings of other researchers I was often 
asked, 'Why are the names changed? Why have people not 
got credit for their information? What is the researcher 
trying to hide by changing names? What are the inform- 
ants trying to hide?' Surely, my informants reasoned, 'it is 
more honest to use the correct names as that way informa- 
tion can be checked'. To these urban activists, disguising 
informants and research sites was not only questionable, 
but indicated the first step towards the creation of an unac- 
countable fantasy world. When it came to my turn to write 
I named my field sites and my main informants. While this 
approach was not without problems - one informant in 
particular was offended by how he had been represented - 
in the context within which I was working it was the most 
acceptable one. 
But now the situation is radically different. One of the 
primary concerns I have at present is the protection of my 
informants. In my written work I no longer identify indi- 
viduals, the area, or even the district as to do so would 
place people in danger. Yet the notion that I can fully pro- 
tect my informants is clearly na"ve.9 By the time I started 
my work on the Maoist insurgency I already had a history 
of doing research in this area and among these people. 
Someone serious about discovering where I had done my 
fieldwork in the past and where I am doing it now can 
easily do so. By choosing to address these issues in this 
article I am providing clues that would enable my work to 
be located. Despite my intentions it is not possible to pro- 
vide more than a measure of confidentiality. The alterna- 
tive is to be silent, but then I, like so many Nepalis who 
face threats, would have become voiceless - silenced by 
the conflict. In keeping with writers such as Taussig 
(1987), Scheper-Hughes (1995) and Sluka (2000), I 
believe that it is important to write against terror. The chal- 
lenge is to ensure to the extent possible that such writing 
does not have unintended consequences, or create new 
threats, for those who are written about. 
In my first publication to arise out of this research on the 
conflict, I represented my informants as generic 'rural 
Nepalis' and omitted culture-specific reactions to the con- 
flict in an attempt to mute the cultural and ethnic identi- 
fiers. Subsequently, I have rethought this position and now 
feel that it is possible, and in fact important, to use identi- 
fiers, as otherwise the work lacks the context and detail 
that makes for good ethnography. My current project - a 
book on the impact of the conflict on rural civilians - 
incorporates culture-specific material with careful dis- 
guise of locations, individuals and other identifying fac- 
tors. As the data has been gathered from multiple sites, and 
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Fig. 8. A poster widely 
distributed in Nepal in 2002, 
showing  Maoist leaders 
declared terrorists'. The 
government offered cash 
rewards for information 
leading to their capture. 
conventional patterns of field visits have been avoided, the 
'research trail' is deliberately difficult to follow. This con- 
trasts with the notion that rigour in qualitative research can 
be enhanced by an 'audit trail' whereby the research doc- 
uments can be scrutinized by external evaluators. The 
'audit' process is intended to reveal the chronological 
steps taken and field methodologies used by the original 
researcher (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). In conflict situa- 
tions, such research strategies are not only ineffective, but 
may even constitute 'bad practice'. Instead, new strategies 
which evolve in relation to the particular conflict situation 
are required. 
Consequently, my new fieldwork has required me to 
rethink old data collection techniques. The age-old notion 
that 'if it isn't written down, it didn't happen' (Kovats- 
Bernat 2002: 215) is irrelevant. In the field I take heavily 
disguised rough notes, since keeping detailed research 
records is impossible as it could place informants, assis- 
tants, other support staff or myself in danger. I have 
stopped my research assistant taking notes, and I carry the 
brief retrospective notes he writes in the town during our 
journey to the city. I have developed my ability to 
remember interviews, scenes or particular events in detail 
rather than commit them to paper when it might be unsafe 
to do so. On return to the city we expand on our rough 
notes on my computer. Pseudonyms are used for locations 
and informant names, and on one occasion after we had 
encountered a large number of Maoists in a village, and 
had detailed observations concerning villager-Maoist 
interactions, we wrote our field notes as if they were a fic- 
titious report based in a distant land. 
Despite these precautions, however, I am in agreement 
with Peritore (1990) and Kovats-Bernat (2002) when they 
suggest that the identities of informants might be compro- 
mised by the unobserved lapses in attention that regularly 
occur during the daily grind of fieldwork. In other words, 
the encryption of notes taken in dangerous field locations 
must always be recognized as imper- 
fect, and the researcher must work with 
a constant awareness of possible con- 
sequences. Ethnographers working  
in conflict situations must simulta- 
neously  face  the  challenge  of 
developing   new   strategies   to 
enhance their safety and those 
of their informants and that of 
identifying and explaining the 
unique  social  interrelations 
that occur in the midst of 
crisis and strife (Kovats- 
Bernat 2002). While cau- 
tion, foresight and 
experience play an 
important role in man- 
aging  dangerous 
field situations, the 
inherent instability 
and complexity 
of   such   work 
ensures that 
there   are   no 
e a s y 
answers. 
 
Ian Harper 
Nepal's   position   within   a   broader  
regional    and    global    geopolitical    context 
changed dramatically after 11 September 2001. A polit- 
ically unstable Nepal is now recognized as a potential 
threat to both US and regional security. The Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist) was briefly included on the US 
roster of international terrorist organizations. 
Simultaneously, the Nepali state appropriated the term 
'terrorist' to label the outlawed Maoist party and its adher- 
ents during the state of emergency, and this label remained 
in place until the ceasefire agreement of January 2003. 
During the first nationally escalated phase of the conflict 
from late 2001 until early 2003, both the British and the 
American government justified direct military support for 
the Royal Nepalese Army by citing Nepal's 'terrorist 
problem', coupled with the rhetoric of defending a geopo- 
litically important, yet weak, emerging democratic polity. 
Yet during this period Nepal entered into a constitutional 
crisis, with King Gyanendra dissolving parliament on 4 
October 2002. Considering that the army remains loyal to 
the king rather than to the elected prime minister, the cur- 
rent external military support for the Royal Nepalese 
Army seems to be hastening the demise of democratic 
process. 
How do we react to these changing circumstances as cit- 
izens, residents and researchers?10 Where do our responsi- 
bilities lie, or with whom do we become complicit? Most 
immediately, as my own government defends its support 
of the military in Nepal in terms of allowing an emergent 
democracy to defend itself, how should we react to the 
empirical reality of the collapse of its infrastructure? How 
do we respond to the acute rise in human rights viola- 
tions?11 As Pat Caplan (2003) asks in a recent volume on 
ethics, particularly given the recent global changes, should 
we as anthropologists remain 'speechless'? 
In answering these questions, I believe that we have a 
responsibility to publicize the consequences of milita- 
rizing Nepal's current socio-political problems.12 I am pre- 
pared to use my research and long-standing relationship 
with Nepal to do this. Judith Pettigrew and I, for example, 
have been involved with a collective of concerned aca- 
demics, development workers, human rights activists and 
others in posing relevant questions to policy-makers in the 
UK. Such ongoing discussion between Nepal specialists 
and UK government officials is one way in which we may 
put our knowledge of Nepal to strategic political use. 
Whether  such  engagement  actually  has  any 
immediately quantifiable impact is open 
to question. The British govern- 
ment  gifted  two  mili- 
tary   helicopters   to   
the   Nepalese   army 
earlier in the conflict, 
and recent unconfirmed 
reports   suggest   further 
surveillance equipment is 
to  be  donated.  Although 
British   government   assis- 
tance to the Nepali security 
forces is classified as 'non- 
lethal', there is a certain amount 
of ambiguity, and a need for 
greater  accountability  to  British 
taxpayers as to how such money is 
spent. 
In late 2002, as the US Congress 
considered foreign military allocations  
for the coming year, all three of  us 
signed a petition demanding that the US 
did not provide the Nepali military with 
extra support.13 In signing this, we found 
ourselves entering into increasingly  con- 
tested political and ethical waters. Some of 
our academic colleagues were critical of this 
stand, reasoning that an ostensibly democratic 
regime had the right to defend itself against armed insur- 
gents.  Some  Nepali  colleagues  felt  that  this  petition 
   
mind that there are disparities in wealth, power, legal 
status and political interests between national systems. But 
this paints an overly static picture of relationships between 
researchers and governments, without acknowledging 
how they may change dramatically in rapid reaction to 
international, national and local events. Such shifts 
impinge critically on our research at all levels, including 
the consequent political positions we choose to adopt, or 
are pushed into adopting for strategic reasons. As Mills 
suggests, now is not the time to congratulate ourselves on 
our discipline's political and ethical reflexivity (2003). 
Rather, in the glaring light of the harsh political realities of 
our research areas, perhaps we ought to expand further the 
dialogue on the ethics and politics of our discipline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Maoist fighters as 
part of the audience at a 
cultural programme. The 
banner in the background 
says, American imperialism 
- quit Nepal'. Surkhet 
district, June 2003. 
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overtly interfered with the workings of the Nepali state and 
overstepped the appropriate boundaries of foreign aca- 
demic engagement. However, others found the petition a 
welcome show of support for a position that was difficult 
to voice openly inside Nepal at the time. 
In such a complex and shifting terrain, we must ask our- 
selves about the relationship between scholarly activity 
and our own personal political positions, which has rightly 
long been a focus of ethical attention in anthropology. 
While I acknowledge that we can nominally separate our 
research agendas from our personal politics, when I sign a 
petition or take a public political stand in my capacity as a 
lecturer at an academic institution, for example, I know- 
ingly appropriate the status of this position. I do not speak 
as an individual alone, but am backed by the weight of a 
certain  authority  granted  by  my  academic  standing, 
regardless of my own area of expertise. In this way dis- 
tinctions between our personal political positions and our 
subjectivities   as   researchers   become   less   clear-cut. 
Becoming explicitly and intentionally complicit with cer- 
tain political agendas has the benefit of being overt and 
thereby creating an arena for debate. Colleagues who do 
not articulate their position, or who feel uncritically that it 
is the right of any state to defend itself against 'terrorist' 
groups, could be perceived as being implicitly complicit 
with the diverse political interests hindering a reinstate- 
ment of the democratic process in Nepal today. Perhaps it 
is wiser to be explicitly complicit, whenever possible, than 
to be assigned complicity by default in the wake of silence. 
Since the Nepali state is in a downward spiral in terms  
of democratic process, I shall finish by reconsidering the 
ASA guidelines on research ethics, particularly the section 
on 'relations with own and host governments'. A critical 
reading of this section of the guidelines leads me to ques- 
tion their utility as a guide for best practice in the light of 
our multiply complex range of subject positions. Given the 
state of Nepal's current lack of democratic legitimacy, the 
uncertain relationships between it and our own countries 
of citizenship and residence, and the potential and real 
dangers of these engagements for our informants, it is vital 
to reconsider the classical ethical question: to whom are we 
responsible? But the answers are increasingly less clear- 
cut. The ASA guidelines frame the question of ethics in 
terms of our 'relations with and responsibilities towards' a 
number of actors in the research experience - research par- 
ticipants; sponsors, funders and employers; colleagues and 
the discipline; own and host governments; wider society - 
and provide quite a broad base for considering what to do, 
or what not to do.14 The section on relations with own and 
host states does suggest that, as researchers, we ought to 
examine the issues of cross-national research, bearing in 
Concluding remarks 
We believe that we must reconsider our research positions 
more carefully within a range of varied, rapidly shifting 
and often competing discursive positions. The notion of 
'complicity' is useful, also in its everyday meaning - 'the 
act of taking part with another person in a crime' 
(Wehmeier 2002) - as it highlights the contextual, yet rela- 
tional nature of our enterprise, as one where any chance of 
appropriating the moral high ground is lost. As 
Shneiderman's narrative suggests, emerging conflict situ- 
ations can add unexpected complexities to already chal- 
lenging relationships in the field. But rather than shying 
away from such difficulties, or ignoring them as conflict- 
related problems irrelevant to the 'real' fieldwork at hand, 
these issues must be engaged with fully on anthropological 
and personal levels. Anthropologists must evaluate the 
real dangers to both themselves and informants as far as 
possible, yet at the same time be ready to take a political 
stand which may involve making choices between com- 
peting complicities. As Harper also points out, these com- 
plicities and responsibilities play out in broader political 
fields that extend beyond the boundaries of Nepal, into the 
transnational realm in which our political views as citizens 
at home are shaped. 
Furthermore, as Pettigrew shows, we must recognize the 
impossibility of fully anonymizing our informants, 
although we must minimize the potential for identification 
whenever possible. The very need to do this stands in stark 
contrast to previously appropriate techniques, such as the 
imperative to name informants within the context of cul- 
tural revivalism. These opposing strategies demonstrate 
the constant need for flexibility and insight on our part as 
anthropologists, so as to avoid reifying any one research 
strategy as the 'right' one for a particular place or time. In 
conditions of war any representation, regardless of autho- 
rial intent, can become dangerous if it is appropriated as 
intelligence by actors on either side of the conflict (Lee 
1995). It is our responsibility to safeguard our information 
from being used in that manner to the extent possible, and 
doing so requires a nuanced understanding of the relation- 
ships that inform our representational strategies. 
As Wax and Gusterson point out in the June 2003 edi- 
tion of ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY, and David Price (2001) has 
highlighted in earlier issues, the question of anthropolo- 
gists' wartime allegiances is not new. Perhaps, however, 
we should follow Danny Hoffman in recognizing that the 
definition of 'wartime' itself needs rethinking. Reflecting 
upon our experiences in the rapidly shifting conflict envi- 
ronment of Nepal, it is clear that anthropologists of all 
sorts must become increasingly conscious of their own 
ethical positions and complicities, and their effects on 
others at local, national and international levels. The 
'frontline' may no longer be somewhere you go intention- 
ally, but rather something that can emerge around you at 
any time, encompassing past work, relationships and eth- 
ical certainties with its new requirements. 
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